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Abstract
We consider here an extended SIR model, including several features of the
recent COVID-19 outbreak: in particular the infected and recovered individuals
can either be detected (+) or undetected (-) and we also integrate an intensive care
unit capacity. Our model enables a tractable quantitative analysis of the optimal
policy for the control of the epidemic dynamics using both lockdown and detection
intervention levers. With parametric specification based on literature on COVID-
19, we investigate sensitivity of various quantities on optimal strategies, taking
into account the subtle tradeoff between the sanitary and the economic cost of
the pandemic, together with the limited capacity level of ICU. We identify the
optimal lockdown policy as an intervention structured in 4 successive phases: First
a quick and strong lockdown intervention to stop the exponential growth of the
contagion; second a short transition phase to reduce the prevalence of the virus;
third a long period with full ICU capacity and stable virus prevalence; finally
a return to normal social interactions with disappearance of the virus. We also
provide optimal intervention measures with increasing ICU capacity, as well as
optimization over the effort on detection of infectious and immune individuals.
Keywords: COVID-19, Optimal Control, SIR, Lockdown, Testing, Intensive Care Unit
(ICU), SARS-CoV-2, Sustainability, Detection, Quarantine
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1 Introduction
Within a few weeks, the COVID-19 took most of the world by surprise, starting with Asia, then
Europe and finally America (see World Health Organization (2020); Kucharski et al. (2020); Ma-
gal and Webb (2020)). More specifically, the COVID-19 turned out to be much more contagious
than expected, and official health authorities understood that letting the virus spread freely would
probably saturate hospital capacities. In most countries, aggressive quarantine and lockdown
measures have been taken, hopefully to stop the spread of the virus and infection, or at least to
slow down its diffusion and delay the cases over time to avoid saturation of healthcare systems.
The effectiveness of these non-pharmaceutical interventions have been questioned in Hellewell
et al. (2020); Kucharski et al. (2020). It was already suggested in Qualls et al. (2017), but then
emphasized by Ferguson et al. (2020), that these measures should rather aim at ‘flattening the
curve’: mitigation seems more realistic than suppression, since eliminating the threat necessarily
takes time, and a massive arrival of people in need in hospitals would be dramatic.
The first control used by health authorities was based on quarantines, historically a natural
technique to lower social interactions and reduce the spread of the disease, as recalled in Tognotti
(2013). Classically, infected people are isolated, to avoid further transmission, but COVID-19 has
a potentially high rate of asymptomatic infected individuals, as mentioned in Al-Tawfiq (2020);
Day (2020); He et al. (2020); Nishiura et al. (2020) or Zhou et al. (2020). This explains why most
countries used indiscriminate lockdown. In order to distinguish between the susceptible, but
still unaffected, individuals and the either asymptomatic infected or undetected recovered ones,
testing is necessary. Piloting these interventions is a key problem, in particular for monitoring
exit strategies.
In the recent literature on the COVID-19, many papers have focused on the effect of lockdown
on the spread of the disease (e.g. Berger et al. (2020); Roques et al. (2020)) or on the evaluation
via simulations of exit-strategies (e.g. Domenico et al. (2020); Evgeniou et al. (2020)). In
this paper, we suggest a different approach for evaluating lockdown and exit scenarios based on
Optimal Control theory (e.g. Pontryagin et al. (1964)). Although the analysis of public health
policies using controls is of clear practical value, there has not been a so dense literature on
the subject (e.g. Abakuks (1973, 1974); Behncke (2000); Greenhalg (1988); Hansen and Day
(2011); Agusto and Adekunle (2014); Sharomi and Malik (2017)). We consider a modified SIR
model, incorporating all the features related to the recent COVID-19 outbreak mentioned above,
and use optimization algorithms to compute the ‘best’ level of lockdown and detection effort in
testing individuals. The criterion to rank the different possible strategies takes into account: 1)
the death toll of the epidemic, 2) the economic and social costs of the lockdown, 3) the required
effort for detecting infected or immune individuals. Besides, we only consider strategies never
exceeding the capacity level of the ICU sanitary system.
One of the originality of the model considered here is the particular focus on the outcomes of the
intensive care units (ICU) saturation, which in many countries have been put under great pressure
and whose capacities are determining factors for the death toll of the disease. We assume a
capacity constraints on how many individuals can be treated in ICU at a given time. Once the
threshold is reached, the fatality rate for the additional patients sent to ICU rises sharply. For
the COVID-19 outbreak, we are aware of some works by Alvarez et al. (2020); Djidjou-Demasse
et al. (2020); Piguillem and Shi (2020), but none of these work models the ICU capacities. In
Acemoglu et al. (2020), no ICU capacity is explicitly introduced, but these authors choose a death
rate in hospitals that depends linearly on the number of patients. The non-linearity induced by the
threshold that we introduce provides very interesting phenomena and insights for the control of
the disease. Furthermore, we investigate cases where the ICU capacity is increasing and evolving
dynamically over time.
A second feature in our work is that we consider two levers for control: the quarantine ratio and
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the testing effort for infection and immunity. One of our motivation is to study qualitatively the
balance existing between efficient testing and strong confinement strategies. Actually, two testing
procedures can be performed here. A short range one, that can detect, at time t if someone is
infected, or not (Polymerase chain reaction or PCR tests, that can detect whether an individual
is infected and send her/him in quarantine). And a long range one, that can detect if someone is
immune or not (a blood test as in Huang et al. (2020)).
Our main findings consists in identifying four main phases in the optimally controlled epi-
demic dynamics. First, a strong and quick lockdown intervention allows to stop the exponential
growth of the epidemic spreading and bring the effective reproducing number R under level
1. Then begins a short transition period during which R remains below 1 as the prevalence of
the virus within the population diminishes progressively until reaching a threshold I∗. Since
the beginning of the epidemic, the number of individuals requiring ICU is rising and reaches
Umax when the virus prevalence attains I∗. Then begins a very long period during which the
reproducing number R stabilizes at level 1 while the virus prevalence and the ICU occupation
remain stable at levels I∗ and Umax. Finally, when a sufficient proportion of the population
has already been infected and the herd immunity level is close enough, a light final release of
lockdown measure allows to retrieve a regular level of social interactions and end the epidemic
phase. The enhanced pattern of the optimally controlled epidemic dynamics reveal to be very
robust to variations of the model parameter within a reasonable range. The effect of the infection
detection effort reveals to be more subtle: it allows to reduce significantly the dynamic death toll
but can not prevail from the resurgence of a second epidemic wave.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the ‘Methods’ section (2), we derive
our SIDUHR+/− model from a standard SIR model (see Section 2.1), and explain all the
components of the dynamics. The infectious individuals may either: i) be asymptomatic or
have mild symptoms that do not require hospitalization, ii) need hospitalization with or without
intensive care. In section 2.2 we present the optimal control problem and objective function of
public health authorities. Possible control levers are discussed in section 2.2.1, with lockdown,
testing tracing and isolation, and ICU capacities. In section 2.2.2 we motivate the choice of the
objective function, and discuss optimal control in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.
In the ‘Discussion’ section (3), we compute the optimal strategy based on a choice of
parameters from the COVID-19 epidemic in France, but of course the methods and findings can
be transposed to any other country or set of parameters. In section 3.1, the benchmark scenario is
described. Then, in section 3.2 we consider optimal lockdown, and discuss the 4 stage dynamics.
In section 3.3, we provide a sensitivity analysis, and discuss the impact of changes of various
parameters. In sections 3.4 and 3.5, we consider the impact of two other controls: the ICU
sustainability level and detection ressources. Given the simplicity of the compartmental model
considered here, our purpose is not to give detailed prediction of the epidemic but rather to
highlight very interesting aspects of the interplay between different levers (lockdown, detection
and ICU capacity), provide qualitative description of the outcomes in each scenarios and give
rough estimates of the duration and size of the epidemics.
2 Methods
2.1 The SIDUHR+/− model and its dynamics
Compartmental models, where the population is divided into classes defined by the status of the
individuals with respect to the disease or how they are taken in charge by the healthcare system
are very popular in mathematical epidemiology (see e.g. Anderson and May (1991); Diekmann
et al. (2012); Ball et al. (2019) for an introduction). One of the simplest and most fundamental
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of all epidemiological models is the popular SIRmodel, developed in Kermack and McKendrick
(1927). The population, of fixed size, is divided into three categories: susceptible (S), infected
(I) and recovered (R) individuals. We denote by St , It and Rt the respective proportions in the
populations at time t (measured in days). In order to adapt the SIR model to the COVID-19
epidemic and take into account lockdown and testing strategies with their economic and social
impacts, we modify some rates and add compartments to the SIR model.
We want to take into account two important features of the COVID-19 pandemic. The first
one is the important proportion of asymptomatic patients, and the small use of testing in several
countries. We will split the I group in two: I− the non-tested, or asymptomatic individuals, but
contagious, and I+ the detected part of infected individuals. The second feature is the problem
highlighted in the ‘flatten the curve’ concept (discussed in Ranney et al. (2020), Kissler et al.
(2020) or Gudi et al. (2020)) which means that a goal in the choice of a public health intervention
should be to avoid a surge of demand on the health care system and in particular in ICUs. From
a modelling perspective, we introduce the proportions Ht and Ut of individuals using the health
care system with or without the need of ICUs. There is an exogenous sustainable limit Umax for
the ICU system, above which the death rate is significantly higher.
Compartments More specifically, all possible states can be visualized on Figure 1. The
parameters for the dynamics are described in the next section.
• S: susceptible, never tested positive, never infected and not dead (where people are by
default). The can get infected by infectious and not quarantined individuals, i.e. individuals
in I−. When susceptible individuals get infected, they move to I−.
• I−: infected non-detected. Those individuals can be asymptomatic, not sick enough to
go the the hospitals, and were not tested. They can either get tested (with type-1 tests,
and then move to I+), get sicker and then go to the hospital (H) or simply recover and get
immune, but still not detected (denoted R−)
• I+: infected detected (non-hospitalized), that would naturally be isolated. They can
either get sicker and then go to the hospital (H) or recover (in which case they go to the
compartment R+ since they were tested positive). Here, we assume that the individuals in
I+ cannot infect anyone since they are strongly isolated.
• R−: recovered non-detected. Those can be detected using blood-type tests (also named
type-2) and move to R+.
• R+: recovered detected. We assume here that all recovered individuals (both R− and R+)
are immune.
• H: hospitalized (and detected). All people entering the hospital get tested. They can
either get sicker and then go to intensive care (U), or get immunity after recovering, and
then move to R+. Note that H is an intermediary state, before getting really sick, or die.
Individuals are not allowed here to go from I (detected or not) to D. Furthermore, we
did not distinguish explicitly between mild and severe infected (as in other models), but,
somehow, H could correspond to severe cases.
• U: hospitalized in ICU, for people at a more advanced stage (and detected), who need
ventilators and other specialized medical care . They arrive from H, and they can either
get immunity after recovering, and then move to R+, or die (D)
• D: dead, from the disease.
Here, recovered are not contagious anymore and we assume that they get immunity (and therefore,
can not get infected again). This is a rather strong assumption, especially on a long term horizon.
Choe et al. (2017) used a longitudinal study to show that those infected by MERS in South
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Korea (with a significant degree of immunity post-infection) had immunity that lasted for up to
a year, as well as, more recently Aldridge et al. (2020), on historical patterns of three common
corona-viruses.
S I− R−
I+
H
R+
U D
(1 − δ)β
λ1
γHR
γUR
γHU γUD
γIR
γIH
γIR
γIH
λ2
Figure 1: The SIDUHR+/− model
Dynamics The evolution of the sizes of each compartments is assumed to be modelled by the
following system of ordinary differential equations:

dSt = −(1 − δt )βt I−Stdt, Susceptible
dI−t = (1 − δt )βI−t Stdt − λ1t I−t dt − (γIR + γIH )I−t dt, Infected undetected
dI+t = λ
1
t I
−
t dt − (γIR + γIH )I+t dt, Infected detected
dR−t = γIR I−t dt − λ2t R−t dt, Recovered undetected
dR+t = γIR I
+
t dt + λ
2
t R
−
t dt + γHRHtdt + γUR(Ut )Utdt, Recovered detected
dHt = γIH
(
I−t + I+t
)
dt − (γHR + γHU )Htdt, Hospitalized
dUt = γHUHtdt − (γUR(Ut ) + γUD(Ut ))Utdt, ICU
dDt = γUD(Ut )Utdt, Dead
(1)
Let us explain the different parameters. The transmission rate β is the rate at which an
undetected infected individual transmits the disease to a susceptible one. Multiplying this
parameter by St I−t , which is proportional to the number of pairs that we can form with an S
and an I− individual, provides the total infection rate at the level of the population and at time
t: βSt I−t . Heuristically, this quantity can also be understood as the fraction of the population
infected during a unit time interval at time t. The infection rate β is reduced by a factor (1 − δ)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] comes from social distancing, quarantine, isolation interventions that reduce
infectious contact rates. We consider two ways of testing individuals: short range tests allow to
discover new infectious individuals in I− and we denote by λ1 the rate at which each of these
infectious individuals gets detected, long range test allow to find formerly infected and hereby
immune individuals that are now in R− and we denote by λ2 the corresponding rate. Here we
are interested in the case where the parameters δ and λ1 are control variables and in the sequel,
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these parameters will be made time dependent.
The recovery rate for an infected individual is γIR . The rate at which an infected individual
enters the health system is γIH . We assume here that both rates γIR and γIH are the same for
detected or non-detected infected individuals. The individual transition rates from H toU or R+,
from U to R+ or to D are denoted by γHU , γHR , γUR(U) and γUD(U) respectively. Notice
that the two later rates γUR(U) and γUD(U) are not constant but depend on Ut : when the ICU
limitation is reached, the extra patients who are not taken in charge by the system can not recover
and are exposed to extra death rates, as explained in the Appendix A.
These parameters are chosen following the tracks of Domenico et al. (2020); Salje et al. (2020).
In these papers, some parameters are fixed according to clinical studies and other are estimated
from French data. The detail on how these parameters are computed in the present paper is given
in Section A. However, we emphasize that although we choose French benchmarks, our input is
more on methodology and can be of interest for other countries or epidemics as well.
Parameters Value Reference
R0 based on (S)
β 0.436 based on (S)
γIR 0.130 based on (D)
γIH 0.00232 based on (D,S)
γHR 0.048 based on (S)
γHU 0.091 based on (S)
γUR(U) ×U 0.078U ∧ 1.564 10−5 based on (S)
γUD(U) ×U 0.02 U ∧Umax + 2(U − 0.0002)+ based on (S)
Umax 0.0002 based on (S)
I−0 0.005 estimated
Table 1: Parameter values for the base-scenario, referring to (D) = Domenico et al.
(2020), (S) = Salje et al. (2020) or (W) =World Health Organization (2020). Individual
rates are given except for the transition rates fromU to R or D where the global rates at
the population level are given, to better explain the nonlinearity. Details are presented
in Appendix A.
The system described here can be derived from individual based stochastic processes (e.g.
Ball et al. (2019)) and thus, there is an underlying individual based model where all the rates
have a probabilistic and statistical interpretation (see Section A, with connection to continuous
time Markov chains. As we will discuss later on, those parameters can therefore be interpreted
as inverse of transition time lengths.
The initial time t = 0 corresponds to the time at which policies that reduce the infection
rate are put in place (δ > 0), or the time at which testing is started (λ1 > 0). For the French
COVID-19 epidemic, it would correspond to March 17th 2020, but again, we emphasize that our
methodology remains of interest for other countries or diseases (see Pedersen and Meneghini
(2020) for informations about country specific informations).
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Basic and effective reproducing numbers R0 and Rt The basic reproduction number
R0 corresponds to the expected number of individuals directly contaminated by a typical infected
individual during the early stage of the outbreak (when the proportion of susceptible individuals
is close to 1), see Diekmann et al. (1990). When R0 < 1, the disease does not spread quickly
enough, resulting in a decay in the number of infected individuals. But whenR0 > 1, the infected
population grows over time.
As recalled in Trapman et al. (2016), the value of the R0 is model-dependent. For the model
considered here, only the I− individuals can transmit the disease to infect susceptible individuals.
If we see I− as the infected class, and if we merge the classes I+, R−, R+, H, U and D into a
large ‘recovered’ class, in this SIR type of model, the dynamics of I−t has infection rate (1 − δ)β
and removal rate λ1 + γIR + γIH , assuming that δ = δ0 and λ1 = λ10 are constant over time. In
that model, the basic reproduction number is
R0 =
(1 − δ0)β
λ10 + γIR + γIH
(2)
Without intervention (i.e. for (δ, λ1) = (0, 0)) and with our chosen parameters provided in Table
1, this corresponds to R0 = β/(γIR + γIH ) = 3.3 which is in line with Salje et al. (2020).
Sensitivity of our results with respect to variations of R0 within the range [3.3, 3.6] is discussed
in Section B.2.
In the case where λ and δ evolve with time, we will have a dynamic R0 that is called effective
reproduction number, see Anderson and May (1991). More specifically, ,at time t ≥ 0, let us
define
Rt =
(1 − δt )βSt
λ1t + (γIR + γIH )
. (3)
Its interpretation is very close to the static version R0. When Rt < 1, the average number of
secondary cases started from one primary case with symptom onset on day t, dies out quickly,
resulting in a decay in the number of infected individuals in the population. But when Rt > 1,
the infected population grows over time. So we should expect to have controls on the quarantine
level δt and on the testing rate λt that will constrain Rt to be reduced beyond 1, at least after
some starting time.
Another information brought by Rt < 1 is that when St < 1/R0 = S∗, the epidemics can
not spread and enters into a sub-critical phase where it goes to extinction. This is related to
the so-called ‘herd immunity’. In our case, S∗ ' 30.3%. Vaccine and testing can increase this
threshold S∗ as they decrease R0.
2.2 The optimal control problem
In the previous section, we described our epidemiological model in order to characterize the
dynamics of the virus spreading processes. We now consider a government acting as a global
planer, who wants to control the epidemic dynamics in order to balance the induced sanitary
and economic outcomes. In order to mitigate the effects of an epidemic, several parameters in
the model are now interpreted as ‘control levers’, and we now focus on the derivation of their
optimal dynamic choice. Optimizing intervention strategies is an important policy issue for
the management of infectious diseases, such as COVID-19. Optimal control in the context of
pandemic models has been used since Abakuks (1973, 1974), Bobisud (1977) or Sethi (1978), in
the 70’s.
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2.2.1 Possible control levers
Quarantines and Lockdown
Lockdown measures proved to be effective in controlling the COVID-19 outbreak in China, as
recalled in Kucharski et al. (2020) or Lai et al. (2020). Quarantine is a rather old technique
used to prevent the spread of diseases. It refers to the restriction of movement of anyone (not
necessarily sick people), and it usually takes place at home, and may be applied at the individual
level. It should be distinguished with isolation, which refers to the restriction of movement of
sick people who have a contagious disease. It can be done in hospitals, in dedicated facilities, or
at home. Those two are seen as active controls, and are different from contact surveillance, which
is passive. Modern quarantine’s goal is to reduce transmission by increasing social distance
between people, by reducing the number of people with whom everyone can be in contact with.
This includes canceling public gatherings, closing public transportation, etc. A lockdown is
intended to stop people from moving between places, and it could involve cancelling flights,
closing borders, and shutting down restaurants. The idea is to reduce the flow of people to curb
transmission, and we might consider here that lockdown and quarantine measures are almost
equivalent.
Sethi (1978) suggested an optimal quarantine problem, in an SIR model, where a proportion
of infected people could be quarantined. He proved that the optimal strategy was either to
quarantine all infected individuals (if so, at early stages) or none. In the context of the 2003
SARS pandemic in Singapore, Ooi et al. (2005) recall that aHome Quarantine Orderwas signed,
but it was more an isolation of sick people than a lockdown as the ones used to lower possible
consequences of COVID-19. But options considered are different, from one country to another.
Wong et al. (2020) mentions that several countries closesd their borders, in most European
countries, schools and restaurants were closed for weeks.
Lagorio et al. (2011) tried to quantify the effectiveness of a quarantine strategy, where healthy
people are advised to avoid contacts with individuals that might carry the disease, using network
based models. Here, the parameter has a direct interpretation, since it is related to the average
rate of contact between individuals. In Yan and Zou (2008) or Ku et al. (2020), quarantine and
isolation are used as control. In our model, those controls correspond to the δt component. As
in Chinazzi et al. (2020), such control can also be related to travel bans, for a weaker form than
strict quarantine. Note finally that Alvarez et al. (2020) suggested that a complete lockdown was
impossible to reach, and that an upper bound of 70% (of the population) should be considered. In
this paper, we do not incorporate any constraint (except that we cannot lockdown more than the
entire population), but interestingly, in the numerical simulation, the upper bound we obtained
as optimal is very close to this value.
Testing, Tracing and Isolating
The secondmost important lever that can be used is detection. As claimed by several governments
(seeGostic et al. (2020)) in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, testing is key to exit lockdown,
and mitigate the health and economic harms of the virus. Here, we assume that health authorities
can perform two kinds of test.
Type-1 test, that could be an antigen test (Reverse Transcription Quantitative Polymerase
Chain Reaction (RT-qPCR) - also called molecular or PCR – Polymerase Chain Reaction – test).
This test allows to detect whether an individual is currently infected or not. It should be used
to determine who self-isolates and for contact tracing. For that test, a sample is collected –
usually with a deep nasal swab (and analysed in a laboratory). This is a short-term test : when
performed at time t on an individual, we know weather an individual is infected or not. Together
with proper detection means, the use of this test corresponds to the λ1t control in our dynamics.
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This test allows to detect and isolate infectious individuals. In our model, they transfer from
compartment I− to compartment I+. It is performed as mandatory when someone arrives at the
hospital. Hereby, any individual being at some point in compartment I+, H or ICU ends up in the
identified immune compartment R+ if he survived the epidemic. We assume for simplicity that
those tests do not have false positive or false negative and leave for further research the impact
of the test sensitivity on the epidemic dynamics and optimal control. Thus, the tests are are all
positive on individuals in I− and negative on individuals in S and R−. Other individuals will not
be tested.
Type-2 test is an antibody test (using serological immunoassays that detects viral-specific
antibodies – Immunoglobin M (IgM) and G (IgG) – also called serology or immunity test).
It allows to test weather an individual can now be considered immune to the virus. It could
potentially be used to issue immunity certificates in order to help restarting the economy quicker.
It is also useful for contact tracing purpose as it helps identifying individuals that can not become
infectious again. For such a test, a blood or saliva sample is applied to a strip that identifies
presence of antibodies. We assume here that immunity lasts long enough with respect to the
epidemic duration, and R+ regroups le collection of immune detected individuals. It is a long-
term one : when performed at time t on an individual, we know if that person had the disease
before. The detection using those tests identifies in our model to the control variable λ2t . It allows
to transfer individuals from compartment R− to compartment R+, but again, people in S will be
tested also, as well as people in I−. As for Type-1 tests, we will suppose here that these tests do
not make any wrong identification.
For type-2 tests, a small sample of a patient’s blood – for instance via a pin prick – and the test
looks for two specific types of antibody: IgM and IgG. IgM are the first antibodies to be produced
by the immune system. They have a half-life of around five days, and they usually appear within
five to seven days of infection and peak at around 21 days. Detection of these antibodies suggests
the person has existent or a recent infection. IgG antibodies are more numerous and can be
detected around 10 to 14 days after infection. The presence of these antibodies indicates a person
has recovered from the virus and is now immune.
‘Raising the line’ and ICU Capacities
So far, we have assumed that the sustainable capacity of ICUs was not a control, and should be
considered as an exogeneous fixed boundary (denoted Umax). As discussed in Gelardi (2020),
preventing a health care system from being overwhelmed requires a society to do two things:
’flatten the curve’ – that is, slow the rate of infection so there aren’t too many cases that need
hospitalization at one time – and ’raise the line’ – that is, boost the hospital system’s capacity to
treat large numbers of patients" (see also Barclay (2020)). Therefore, a natural control variable
is the level of the line, or Umax as we named it.
Nevertheless, we will not consider Umax as a control variable that can be optimized (such
as the strength of the lockdown, or the effort in detection), since it is difficult to assess the cost
of raising it. Nevertheless, in Section 3.4, we consider the case where health authorities can
increase that capacity, by making ventilators and other medical material necessary in the context
of the pandemic, but it cannot be increased indefinitely since ICU also require trained personal
and even if adjustments can be considered, we assume that it is not realistic to assume that Umax
can be increased by more than 50%.
2.2.2 Objective function
We now turn to the design of the objective function, trying to take into consideration the sanitary
and socio-economic outcomes of the lockdown and detection policy. In the context of planning
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vaccination campaigns, da Cruz et al. (2011) and Verriest et al. (2005) suggest a convex quadratic
cost function by minimizing both the number of infected individuals in a time horizon and the
cost to implement the control policy. In Kim et al. (2017), a model for 2009 A/H1N1 influenza
in Korea is considered. The goal is to minimize the number of infectious individuals and the
cost of implementing the control measures, and the cost is taken to be a nonlinear quadratic
function. Quarantine and vaccination are considered as control variables in Iacoviello and Liuzzi
(2008), and the optimal control is obtained by minimizing a quadratic cost function. Inspired by
those approaches, we will also consider quadratic cost functions. Before going further, let first
introduce some relevant quantities characterizing the epidemic phase that will reveal useful in
the upcoming analysis.
Quarantined individuals Let denote byQ the quantity of people concerned by the lockdown
policy and defined by:
Qt := R−t + I−t + St , t ≥ 0. (4)
All the individuals inQt are having the level of contact rate δt with the population at time t. This
proportion of individuals identifies to the people forwhichwe can not say if they already contracted
the virus or not. Therefore, they are all concerned with non targeted lockdown strategies as well as
randomized testing trials. We hereby suppose that infected detected individuals in I+ are isolated
and have no social interactions with the population, whereas detected immune individuals suffer
no mobility constraints and can reach a level of local interactions similar to the one they had
before the beginning of the pandemic.
Global level of social interactions On the other hand, the global level of social interactions
among the population is denotedWt and given by:
Wt := (1 − δt )Qt + R+t , t ≥ 0. (5)
The quantity Wt represents the proportion of social interactions in the population and can be
interpreted as a macroscopic labour force level for the economy at time t.
Testing resources. Finally, in order to measure the detection efforts of infected and immune
individuals, we introduce the following metrics; which identifies to the number of virologic and
anti-body tests done in a (somehow quite unrealistic) fully randomized detection trial:
N1t := λ
1
tQt + γIH I
−
t and N
2
t := λ
2
tQt , t ≥ 0. (6)
Observe that the different formulation between both metrics is due to the fact that individual are
automatically tested using virologic detection methods, when admitted at the hospital.
Vaccination arrival date All health authorities hope for the development of a vaccine for
Covid19 in a close future. In order to encompass uncertainty concerns upon the arrival date of
the vaccine, we consider the arrival date of the vaccination solution to be a random time with
exponential distribution of parameter α, denoted τ. According to recent studies, Jiang et al.
(2020); Cohen (2020), the creation of such vaccine for a sufficient quantity of individuals can
presumably be assumed to require around 500 days. We shall consider a parameter α equal either
to 0, 1/250 or 1/500 for our numerical experiments. For convenience, we assume here that both a
vaccine and a cure simultaneously appear at time τ. Alvarez et al. (2020) also use such a discount
approach, on top of some economic discount rate (assuming also that the vaccine will arrive at
an expected date of 18 months).
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Sanitary cost For the sanitary cost, it seems rather natural to simply consider a death count
metric given byDT . Nevertheless, Oliver (2013) legitimates the use of an appropriate discounting
of health outcomes. About the kind of discount we should use, van der Pol and Cairns (2002)
discusses the use of hyperbolic discount (opposed to classical exponential discount), in the
case of social choice regarding health outcome. The hyperbolic discount allows for asymmetry
in discounting, and non-stationarity, in the sense that postponing in two years now can be
substantially different from postponing in three years (from now) next year. On the other hand,
van der Pol and Cairns (2002) claims that is not necessarily a realistic assumption, so that using a
standard time-consistant exponential discount makes sense in terms of health outcomes. Besides,
the longer we can postpone deaths, the more likely a vaccine will be found before. Adding up
a exponential discounting factor reveals to be also perfectly consistent with the consideration
of random development time of a vaccine solution at large scale, with exponential distribution.
Hence, we will consider a sanitary cost of the form:
Csanitary := E[Dτ ] =
∫ ∞
0
e−αtdDt , (7)
recalling that the random arrival time of the vaccine follows an exponential distribution with
parameter α.
Economic and social cost The gross domestic product (GDP) is directly related to produc-
tion. Here, we would like to capture the loss of productivity and well-being among the population
due to lockdown situation. In a very general setting, the production function is a function of
capital input (K , that usually corresponds to machinery, equipment, buildings, etc.) and labor
(W , that represents the total number of people working): the output produced in a given period
of time is f (K,W). Classically, the production function is a Cobb-Douglas function (as intro-
duced in Cobb and Douglas (1928)) K1−aWa , with a ∈ (0, 1). Power coefficients are the output
elasticities. Here, the function display constant returns to scale, in the sense that doubling the
use of capital K and laborW will also double produced output. Assuming that, on the short term
(say less than a year) capital remains constant, it means that if at time t, only a proportionWt of
individuals can be economically active, the productivity loss is proportional to 1−Wat . Thus, the
inter-temporal economic cost at time t is proportional to (1 −Wat ), or (up to an additive constant)
−Wat . Nevertheless, several other metrics have been used on the literature in order to account
for the economic cost induced by the lockdown situation: Guerrieri et al. (2020) or Eichenbaum
et al. (2020) considered a linear function, while Piguillem and Shi (2020), Bernstein et al. (2020)
or Djidjou-Demasse et al. (2020) considered a convex function. Hereby, the social and economic
cost will be given by:
Cecon := E
[∫ τ
0
(1 −Wt )2dt
]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−αt (1 −Wt )2dt , (8)
where the discounting rate α encompass the distribution of arrival time of a population wide
scalable vaccination solution andW defined in (5) denotes the global level of social interactions
among the population.
Detection cost The quantification of efforts put into the detection of infectious individuals
is a difficult task, as discussed in Liu et al. (2020) in the case of children, but several detection
means are possible. As mentioned in Salathé et al. (2020) and Hellewell et al. (2020), testing is
part of a strategy. TheWorld Health Organization recommends a combination of measures: rapid
diagnosis and immediate isolation of cases, rigorous tracking and precautionary self-isolation of
close contacts. Cohen and Kupferschmidt (2020) compares various techniques used to detect
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infected people. Recall that we assume that a virologic testing is performed for all individuals
entering into the hospital. Besides the a random screening of the population should be conducted
on the non detected individuals, i.e. on the sub-populationQt . This group contains the susceptible
St , the undetected infected I−t as well as the undetected immune R−t . As antibodies detection
should also be performed on the same group Qt , it seems important to take into account the
impact of the size of this group within the population. Besides, as testing resources are sparse,
the metric quantifying the effort of detection must take into account the increasing difficulty for
scaling massively testing resources. For all these reasons, the effort for detecting infected or
immune individuals will be of quadratic form:
Cprevalence := E
[∫ τ
0
|N1t |2dt
]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−αt |N1t |2dt (9)
and Cimmunity := E
[∫ τ
0
|N2t |2dt
]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−αt |N2t |2dt , (10)
where we recall that N1t and N
2
t are given in (6). Again, we consider here a detection cost, not a
testing cost. The testing cost could be seen as linear when random tests are performed, but here,
we assume that the more we test, the more negative results we get, since it will be more difficult
to identify individual susceptible to be infected, or recovered. So a convex function of Nt should
be considered here.
2.2.3 Optimal control under ICU capacity constraint
We are now in position to turn to the design of the global objective function. As in Kumar and
Srivastava (2017), we shall consider a weighted sum of different costs:
• the sanitary cost described in (9) directly related to the mortality rate of the virus;
• An economic and social cost given in (8) due to the reduction of social interactions within
the population;
• A detection cost for identifying infectious and immune individuals; which will be mainly
discussed in Section 3.5 below.
Combining these effects, the global objective function is given by:
J(δ, λ1, λ2) := wsanitaryCsanitary + weconCecon + wprevalenceCprevalence + wimmunityCimmunity
= wsanitary
∫ ∞
0
e−αtdDt + wecon
∫ ∞
0
e−αt (1 −Wt )2dt (11)
+ wprevalence
∫ ∞
0
e−αt |N1t |2dt + wimmunity
∫ ∞
0
e−αt |N2t |2dt ,
where the wi terms are positive weights associated to each marginal cost.
In this paper, we consider a global planner whose objective is to minimize the global cost
given in (11) using the lockdown control lever δ together with the detection lever λ = (λ1; λ2).
Nevertheless, we did not yet take into account the risks and outcomes induced by the saturation
of ICU hospital care facilities. The dynamics of the SIDUHR+/− model already takes into
account the strong impact of ICU saturation on the mortality rate on individuals with severe
symptoms. Whenever the proportion of individual in U exceeds the upper bound level Umax,
patients can not be treated correctly so that patients are more likely to transfer to D instead of R+,
in comparison to calmer times where U < Umax. With such feature, the optimal lockdown and
detection strategies should undoubtedly try to limit the duration of periods where the maximal
ICU capacity is exceeded. Nevertheless, as we believe that exceeding capacities of ICUs would
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have a strong negative impact on the hospital staff and even the entire population, we rather
choose to impose the non-saturation of ICU as a required state constraint on the system. Hence,
we try to solve the following control problem:
inf
(δ,λ1,λ2)∈A s.t. U≤Umax
{
J(δ, λ1, λ2)} , (12)
whereA denotes the set of admissible strategies driving the dynamics of the SIDUHR+/− model
and is given by
A :=
{
(δ, λ1, λ2) : [0,T] → [0, 1]3 , (δ, λ1, λ2) measurable
}
. (13)
2.2.4 Numerical approximation of the solution
From a mathematical point of view, the optimal control problem of interest falls into the class of
control for deterministic dynamical system over infinite horizon in the presence of additional state
constraint. The detailed presentation of the numerical resolution of this problem is presented
in Section C.2 below. We briefly recall here the main underlying approximations used in the
numerical approach.
In order to optimize the impact on the dynamical structure of the underlying SIDUHR+/− of
the chosen control, wemake use of Pontryaginmaximumprinciple and hereby require the addition
of adjoint variables. For numerical purposes, we restrict our analysis to the consideration of a
control problem with finite horizon. We thus pick a maturity T large enough in order to have a
very small remaining level of infected individuals at time T . In that case, deterministic SIR type
dynamics are not fully reliable anymore so that this approximation does not have any impact on
the derived optimal strategy. In practice, the numerical experiments are indeed not sensitive to
the choice of maturity T , as soon as it is picked large enough. For the graphs shown here, we
used T = 700 days (almost two years). We did run computations up to T = 900 looking for a
potential impact on the results, but since we did not observe any, we restricted our attention to
T = 700 in order to simplify the overall presentation of the results. In order to encompass the
state constraint into the maximum principle based algorithm, we simply represent it under the
form of a penalization cost, whenever the ICU constraint is not satisfied. The penalization is
strong enough to discourage crossing this threshold for most scenarios. See Appendix C for more
details on the implementation.
The algorithm then relies on an iterative procedure. Time is discretized so that the search
for an optimal control reduces to the search for one vector per control variable (δ, λ1, λ2), with
one value per time step. Starting from an initial guess, at each iteration the approximation for the
optimal control is updated based on the expression of the gradient in terms of the solution to a
forward-backward system of ordinary differential equations. In order to ensure that the controls
remain between 0 and 1, a projection of the new controls on the interval [0, 1] is performed at
each iteration.
3 Discussion
3.1 Benchmark scenario without intervention
Let us first investigate the outcomes of the epidemic dynamics when no lockdown, detection nor
quarantine policies are available. Observe that we do not take into account the reaction of the
population in response to the virus prevalence, as discussed in Elie et al. (2020). We suppose
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Figure 2: Evolution of states without control, over 200 days.
that the virus dynamics has no impact on the level of social interactions of individuals. Such
analysis provides a very useful no-intervention benchmark scenario for the rest of our study.
The dynamics of each compartment is provided in Figure 2 while Table 2 provides important
epidemic characteristics computed at terminal date T = 700 days1.
As no intervention interferes with the epidemic dynamics, the overall duration of the epidemic
is very short as the number of susceptible vanishes exponentially fast. The initial reproducing
number R0 = 3.3 induces an epidemic duration lasting around 80 days. The virus prevalence is
quite important over that period, leading to the contamination of almost 96% of the population,
way above the herd immunity threshold, around 71% in our example. The epidemic pic happens
after a onemonth period, and asmuch as one third of the population is infected at that date. Around
7% of the population is hospitalized due to the virus, leading to a highly severe overwhelming of
the healthcare capacity system for around 60 days. The epidemic induces in total a mortality of
almost 1% of the population.
It is worth noticing that ourmodel, with the parameter values of Table 1 that were calibrated on
the French epidemic of COVID-19 (Domenico et al. (2020); Salje et al. (2020)), gives predictions
that are in accordance with the ones made by Roux et al. (2020) in absence of interventions and
neglecting the ICU constraint (see Appendix A for details).
3.2 Optimal lockdown policy without detection effort
In order to emphasize the marginal role of each component in the optimal control problem of
interest, we first focus on the optimal lockdown strategy and corresponding epidemic trajectory
induced without any detection effort. This does not mean that we do not test anyone, we simply
assume that only the people entering in the hospital are tested with type-1 tests. No testing is
done on infected individuals without severe symptoms (λ1 = 0) and there no testing is done to
detect recovered people after being asymptomatically sick (type-2 test, λ2 = 0).
Hereby, we are starting with a weaker form of the optimal control problem, where we control
only the lockdown intervention policy:
inf
(δ)∈Aδ s.t. U≤Umax
{
J(δ, 0, 0)} , (14)
1In all other figures of this article, but that one, we consider a 700 day horizon. Here everything is over
within two months so we shorten the time frame on Figure 2 for ease of readability.
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with the following choice of parameters and wsanitary = 100000, weco = 1 and α = 0. The
sensitivity of the enhanced results to this ad-hoc parametric choice is discussed in Sections B.3
and B.4. Besides, once we will have a better understanding about the derived lockdown strategy
and its robustness, we will focus on the impact of detection strategies in Section 3.5. The optimal
lockdown strategy together with the main characteristics of the pandemic dynamics are presented
in Figure 3 and Table 2. The optimal control problem has been solved using the numerical
algorithm described in Appendix C.2 and numerical approximation errors undoubtedly remain
in the results presented here.
Table 2: Epidemic characteristics
ST IT RT DT maxt (It )
Without control 4.2% 0% 94.8% 9.8‰ 33.7%
With optimal δ 27% ∼ 0% 72.9% 1.7‰ 2%
When we follow the lockdown intervention (δt ) proposed by the optimal response policy,
four distinct consecutive phases can be observed:
1. Quick activation of a strong lockdown: The optimal strategy consists in activating as
soon as possible a strong lockdown measure on the entire population as no targeting or
detection is considered or possible at that stage. This strategy has been widely used in
March and April 2020 as half of the world wide population was under lockdown. With our
parameters, the contact rate over the population is reduced by 80% over a couple of days,
in order to stop immediately the exponential growth of infected and infectious individuals.
Hereby, the size of the epidemic pic is highly reduced and, after less than one month,
only 2% of the population is contaminated at the pic of the epidemic (instead of 34% in
the no-intervention benchmark case). At the exact same date, the effective reproducing
number Rt goes below 1. During this initial short period, the effort in economic activity
reduction has been very important: the working force went down to 20%, while at the
same time the occupation rate in ICU hospital care system has been constantly rising.
2. Light lockdown release and prevalence decrease: During the short second phase, the
intensity of the lockdown remains intense (above 60%) in order to keep Rt below 1. The
prevalence of the virus decreases slowly, while the level of ICU admissions is still rising.
After the previous phase where urgent decisions had to be taken by the global planner, a
short transition period of a couple of days now starts. During this period, the proportion
of infectious individuals decreases strongly in order reach an optimal level of prevalence
in the population, required for the very long next phase.
3. Long period with stable prevalence and ICU sustainable capacity: The third phase
lasts around one year during which the effective reproducing number Rt remains stable at
level 1. Hereby, the prevalence of the virus remains stable while the ICU capacity remains
at the sustainable level Umax. During this one year period, the level of contact rate within
the population is slowly growing at a regular constant rate, moving gradually from 40% to
80%. The working force is rising back to more normal levels and the economy is slowly
restarting: one year after the beginning of the pandemic, around 70% of contact rate level
is already attained within the population. The mortality rate over this period remains
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Figure 3: Evolution of state proportions – St (susceptible), It (infected, detected or
not, I−t + I+t ), Rt (recovered and immune, detected or not, R−t + R+t ), Ut (hospitalized
in ICU), Dt (dead), Rt (dynamic version of the reproduction number),Wt (labor force
available),Qt (susceptible to be quanrantines, St + I−t +R−t ) and δt (lock-down intensity)
– with optimal control δ (plain line) and without control (dotted line). States vary here
from t = 0 (beginning of the pandemic, or at least of possible measures, with δ ≥ 0) to
t = 700, and computations are based on a dt = 1/5 days.
constant, and death toll grows linearly, almost reaching its terminal value at the end of this
period.
4. Terminal slow progressive release of the lockdown: The last phase is a couple of months
long and consists in bringing progressively back to normal the level of social interactions,
while the occupation level in ICU is decreasing and the prevalence of the virus is heading
towards 0. The effective reproducing number Rt is smaller than 1. At some point, the
deterministic equations (1) are no more valid and the system becomes stochastic, but the
extinction of the disease occurs with probability 1.
The optimal structure in four steps for controlling the pandemic dynamics is quite robust
and very natural. It is worth observing that although the dynamic reproducing number is not
part of the criterion of interest, reaching its optimal trajectory with four successive patterns is
key for controlling the dynamic level of admissions in ICU. Using the optimal control policy,
the infections by the virus in the population have been spread out over 500 days, providing
a sustainable level of admissions in ICU for the sanitary system. In comparison to the no-
intervention benchmark case, the death toll has been divided by almost 100, thanks to a strong
reduction in the level of social interactions. The size of the pandemic only represents 70% of the
population in comparison to 96% in the no-intervention scenario.
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Figure 4: Phase diagram St (susceptible) versus It (infected, detected or not, I−t + I+t ),
together with the herd immunity threshold S∗ and the level I∗ of infected corresponding
to U = Umax.
A nice visualisation of the epidemic dynamics is provided by looking at the phase diagram
presented in Figure 4. In the no-intervention scenario, the epidemic dynamics starts from the point
(S, I) = (1, 0) and moves up and left until reaching the herd immunity threshold S∗ corresponding
to the epidemic peak. Then, I starts decreasing until the end of the epidemic, point where S is
valued around 4% in our example: hence, the final epidemic size is almost 96%. In the optimally
controlled scenario, we can clearly identify the 4 phases described above: I is still rising during
the first phase until reaching a small epidemic pic level, it starts decreasing during the second
transition phase until reaching the level I∗ corresponding to a level Umax of ICU admission.
It remains stable there during the long third phase and finally decreases in the last phase until
reaching a susceptible proportion close to the herd immunity level S∗.
Of course, both dynamics depend on the value of the parameters, such as the initial virus
prevalence I−0 , the starting basic reproductive number R0, expectations about possible arrival of
vaccine and cure (through parameter α or weights considered in the objective function). But as
we can see in Appendix B, and as we will discuss more now, the enhanced results are robust to
the parameter specifications.
3.3 Sensitivity of the optimally controlled epidemic dynamics to the
model specifications
The calibration of SIR type dynamics to current available data is currently a challenging task, as
the quality of available mortality and hospitalization figures is still questionable and incomplete.
It is worth noting that one of the main advantage of the SIDUHR+/− dynamics is the possibility
of calibrating its dynamics to mortality, infected detected, hospitalized and ICU data points. Still,
such inverse calibration problem remains ill-posed and the precision range over the calibrated
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parameters is not satisfying.
In order to demonstrate the robustness of our findings in such context, we provide a sensitivity
analysis of our results to modifications in the model specifications. More specifically, we analyse
the impact of reasonable variations with respect to the initial prevalence I−0 in Appendix B.1, the
basic reproducing numberR0 in Appendix B.2, the balance between sanitary and socio-economic
cost in Appendix B.3, and the arrival date of a vaccination solution in Appendix B.4. Let now
present the main outputs of those numerical experiments.
On Figure 6, we can visualize the impact of a change in I−0 , with a smaller (five times) and
larger (also five times) value than the one used in benchmark computations (we used I−0 = 5‰).
The lower value was suggested from Sachdeva and Sheth (2020), with 1‰, five times lower than
our estimate, and an upper value five times upper, of 2.5%, close to the situation two weeks
after according to Sachdeva and Sheth (2020). A smaller value means that measures were taken
earlier, but overall, it looks like the impact would have been rather small. Note that we observe
here that a smaller I−0 might cause more deaths (DT ), because of some balance with economic
gains (economics losses are smaller with a lower I−0 ). Observe also that I
−
0 has almost no impact
on the ICU saturation: it might start earlier with a large I−0 , but the duration is more or less the
same.
On Figure 7, we can visualize the impact of a change in R0, with a smaller (−0.3 i.e. −10%)
and larger (+0.3 i.e. +10%) value than the one used in benchmark computations (R0 = 3.3).
Such variation in R0 is compatible with the literature, see Salje et al. (2020); Domenico et al.
(2020). The overall global patterns of the optimally controlled epidemics remain identical. The
lockdown effort increases slightly but significantly with R0, together with the ICU saturation
phase duration, the global death toll and the global economic cost. Note that a decrease of R0
from 3.6 to 3.0 would decrease ICU saturation time length by almost 25%.
On Figure 8, we can visualize the impact of a change of the ratio between the sanitary weight
wsanitary and the economic one weco, with a smaller (half) and larger (twice) value than the one
used in benchmark computations. The global patterns in the epidemic dynamics remain globally
similar. A larger sanitary weight induces a smaller death toll, a smaller epidemic peak together
with a shorter ICU saturation period. The economic gain or loss seems to be mostly sensible
during the second half of the epidemic duration.
Figure 9 provides the shapes of numerically approximated optimal epidemic curves for dif-
ferent beliefs about the expected arrival time of a vaccine (and a cure). In comparison to the
benchmark case where no vaccine potential creation is taken into account, the arrival date of
the vaccine is supposed to follow an exponential distribution with expectation 500 days. The
epidemic curves are very similar, confirming the robustness of the approach and main findings.
Our main overall observation is that the dynamics of the optimally controlled epidemic
dynamics always present the same patterns and enlights the robustness of our findings. It
divides into four successive phases in a similar way to the one described in the previous main
scenario analysis. Besides, the effective reproduction number Rt together with the optimal
lockdown intervention policy also have the exact similar patterns. Of course small variations in
the specifications still have an influence on the exact figures characterizing the balance between
sanitary and economic outcomes, the total duration of the epidemic or the pressure on the ICU
hospital system, but the overall characteristics remain identical. These observations confirm
the robustness of our findings when dealing the the optimal control problem at hand, under
specification uncertainty. The more specific dependence to the ICU care system capacity is
studied in more details and discussed in the next section.
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3.4 On the impact of additional ICU capacities
As discussed earlier, most countries have been urged to take public health measures to ‘flatten
the curve’. An important motivation was to avoid that hospital systems get overwhelmed,
and more specifically, social distancing was introduced to ensure that the fluxes to ICUs with
ventilators remain within the capacities of hospitals. Previously, we integrated an upper limit
to ICU – denoted by Umax – and in this section, we discuss the impact of a potential increase
of that capacity. Of course, increasing capacity does not simply mean getting more masks,
beds, ventilators, or medicines for the serious cases. It also means diverting resources, training
more staff to work in the ICU, and probably introduce telemedicine solutions for non-COVID-19
patients (who do not require hospitalization) to free up beds.
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Figure 5: Evolution of states with optimal control δ when ‘raising the line’ (increase of
Umax by 50%). The plain line is the benchmark scenario discussed in Section 3.2; the
dashed line corresponds to a capacity ofUmax which increases linearly from time t = 0
until t = 60 days up to 1.5 times the initial capacity and then stays at this level.
On Figure 5, we consider a change in Umax, where we assume that health authorities are
able to increase ICU capacities by 50% over a 2 months period. We can imagine an increase in
the number of more ventilators or back-ups with staff coming from other regions that are spared
by the epidemics, as was done in China or France for instance. Another possible interpretation
is that the medical staff on the front line might be infected in early periods leading to an initial
shortage of personal at the beginning followed by a return to normal within a few weeks. Here,
we consider a regular (linear) increase of ICU capacities over two months, until reaching a new
limit, 50% higher than the original one.
This scenario has a major impact on all quantities. It is worth noting that the derived optimal
lockdown strategy is able to let the ICU admission level bind the sustainable constraint, although
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it grows dynamically with time. The final number of dead people is overall smaller than in the
original scenario, as the expansion of ICU capacity allows to treat more patients simultaneously.
Therefore, the social ancing can be much weaker during the long ICU saturation phase, which
also happens to be way shorter. Furthermore, ICU saturation duration is much shorter with a
major positive impact on the economy from day 100 until day 400, as the lockdown intervention
remains much weaker (after 200 days, the global level of social interactions is around 65% in
comparison to less than 50% in our benchmark scenario). This reduces the socio-economic
impact of the epidemic and hereby allows to reach a smaller mortality count at time T . The
overall gain at terminal date is massive (even if here, we do not include a cost for increasing
capacities). Nevertheless, the augmentation of ICU capacity implies also a higher daily dynamic
death toll, so that an early non-anticipated vaccination solution at an intermediate date would
induce a higher sanitary cost in comparison to the scenario without ICU capacity rising.
3.5 On the impact of detection resources
We now focus our analysis on the impact and optimization over the detection efforts of infectious
or immune individuals. As stated in Peto (2020), mass testing could end the epidemic rapidly,
and we now try to emphasize the impact of light or mass testing upon the lockdown optimal
intervention policy. The numerical results are presented in Appendix B for ease of readability
and we present here the main outputs of our experiments.
On Figure 10, we first consider the introduction of type-1 tests and present the optimal
lockdown intervention strategy in this context. We consider a daily detection λ1 of 1‰ with
the dashed line, 1% with the dotted line and 10% with the mixed line. Of course, the more
effort we put into detecting infected people, the better the output. For instance we observe a
smaller death toll, a weaker economic impact as well as less ICU saturation. Up to remaining
numerical errors, moving the detection capacity λ1 from 1% to 10% has a strong impact on the
overall outcomes of the epidemic: The epidemic size drops from 70% to 30%, the remaining
number of susceptible individuals ST ' 70% corresponds to the herd immunity obtained with
λ1 = 0.1 and δ ' 0.25, the duration of ICU capacity saturation is divided by a factor larger than
2, and the overall sanitary and economic costs are divided by 2. The huge detection of infected
individuals has a strong impact on the socio-economic cost for two reasons: First, detection of
infected individuals allows to slow down the epidemic propagation. Second, detected infected
individuals are later on identified as immune people, i.e. are in compartment R+, so that they
are not impacted by social relations limitation, which reduces the overall economic cost. Finally,
observe that massive testing has a major impact on most output (and must be massive to really
impact, as suggested in Peto (2020)). Observe that ST remains rather large, but hopefully, but
any epidemic restart is avoided by the detection effort λ1 which must not be released (the patterns
of some figures close to terminal date T are due to the numerical approximation of the infinite
horizon problem by a finite one).
Figure 11 provides the optimal policy for the detection of infected whenever no lockdown
measures are in place, while Figure 12 provides the optimal combination of detection policy and
lockdown intervention. For both cases, the weight wprevalence has been set up equal to 1. As
we can observe on both Figure 11 and Figure 12, and as stated clearly in Peto (2020), massive
testing and detection strategies could have been used to end the epidemic rapidly. The optimal
strategy is here to have extremely massive type-1 detection, to isolate infected individuals. Of
course, this will not end the disease, but we can claim that we have here an optimal control on it.
Herd immunity is only ensured if we keep the detection active, ST is still extremely large, and we
simply wait for a cure and virus. With that strategy, the peak on ICU is 25% of the upper limit
Umax, DT is almost null, with no real impact on the economy (there is still an impact since, in
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order to be safe, we still quarantine a significant proportion of people, above 10%). Note here
that the optimal λ1, once we passed the peak, exceeds 25%, which is higher than the scenarios
considered earlier. Observe also that with massive detection tools, optimal lockdown is constant.
On Figure 13, we consider now the introduction of type-2 detection strategy (or testing) and
measure the impact on the optimal lockdown policy. Those tests simply transfer individuals from
compartment R− to R+. This has no impact on the epidemic dynamics, so all sanitary variables are
identical. The only impact is on the economic cost of the pandemic, since identifying recovered
(and immune) individuals will allow them to go back to work, since they will not be quarantined.
On Figure 14, we consider the case where only type-2 detection is considered, while no
lockdown policy is in place, while Figure 15 consider the case where we optimize over both
lockdown intervention δ and immunity detection effort λ2. As expected, additional optimization
over λ2 has few impact on the pandemic, but can be used to lower the economic cost. In particular,
in the presence of immunity detection policy, the level of social interactions during the last phase
of the epidemic is significantly higher, thus reducing the induced economic cost.
On Figure 16, we finally optimize over all possible control levers: lockdown measure,
virologic detection effort λ1 as well as the immunity detection one λ2. We observe an optimal
policy and induced epidemic dynamics rather similar to the one obtained in Figure 12, whenever
no immunity detection mean was available. Furthermore, the optimal λ2 helps in reducing the
overall economic costs by detecting immune people.
4 Conclusion
The present work investigates, using an approach from Optimal Control theory, what could be
optimal interventions for limiting the spread of a disease like the COVID-19 epidemic. We
consider first the case where only the lockdown lever is operated, as was done in France when
massive testing was still not an option. Then, in the other scenarios, optimization is done on both
lockdown and detection capacity.
The notion of ‘best scenario’ depends of course on the choice of cost function that is made.
The optimization takes into account the trade-off between lowering the number of deaths and
minimizing the economic and social costs. To our knowledge, taking into consideration these
diverse aspects into the cost function has not been done much in the recent literature (see e.g.
Acemoglu et al. (2020)).
Another originality of our work how we dealt with the constraint on the ICU capacity. We
see that in the solutions, the lockdown and testing controls are set so that the occupation of ICU
remains a high as possible under Umax (due to the economic and social costs). It is really this
constraint that shapes the decisions leading to a curve that is ‘flattened’ sufficiently to ensure
the sustainability of the health system. This is particularly visible in the scenario where Umax is
increased of 50% at the beginning of the epidemic: we see a relaxation of the lockdown that is
permitted by the increased flux allowed in ICUs.
The best scenarios that we obtain are structured into 4 phases: 1) quick and strong measures
to recover the control of the epidemic, 2) relaxation of the epidemic once under control to reach
the fluxes imposed by the sustainability of the health care system, 3) the fluxes obtained after the
period 2 are kept as long as possible to flatten the curve in order to avoid overwhelming the ICUs,
4) once a herd immunity is reached, the lockdown and testing controls can be lowered.
Without being an explicit target in the control problem, the evolution of Rt is extremely inter-
esting, and consistent with existing epidemiological literature. Again, without monitoring that
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indicator, we obtain in all the optimal strategies, Rt becomes controlled below 1 after a few days
(after the phase 2, and at the price of an important initial lockdown), and remains just below that
critical value2. It is allowed to reach and remain stable at level 1 in order to stabilize the ICU
occupancy at their sustainable level Umax.
Of course, the model considered here is schematic because we wanted : 1) to put the method-
ology in evidence, 2) to explore easily the different scenarios. Generalizations can be carried in a
quite straightforward manner. First, the major drawback of our approach is the necessity to fully
observe some underlying latent variables and parameters of the epidemic dynamics, such as the
prevalence of the virus. But we observed that the shape of the optimal control is quite robust to
a variation of the initial prevalence I−0 , and more generally to variations upon lots of parameters
in the model. An important issue about that COVID-19 pandemic was the poor quality of data
in the beginning, especially when trying to compare among countries to get robust estimators of
various quantities regarding the disease. In our model, we tuned parameters using values from
existing literature, and most of the results we obtained were actually extremely robust to moderate
changes of those values.
Second, most individuals will not experience severe symptomswhenever contaminated by the
virus. Such analysis calls for the use of differential quarantine strategies based on an estimation
of the own risk of each individual. In our approach we use anti body testing procedure for such
purpose, but less accurate estimates of the risk of each individuals are also available depending
on their current and past health characteristics. As discussed in Evgeniou et al. (2020), the key
ingredient for considering and using a differential lockdown strategy is a proper handling of the
risk of bad specification of the group associated to some individuals. A dynamic optimisation
over both the dynamic lockdown intervention together with the risk level associated to each mis-
specification is left for further research. Similarly the risk of wrong identification of infected or
immune individuals using parameters λ1 and λ2 should be also taken into account in the design
of a proper and efficient detection strategy. Also, in view of more practical applications for health
policy guidance, a vector based version of SIDUHR+/− should probably be derived, as in Ace-
moglu et al. (2020) for instance. Categories can be splited depending on the age of individuals.
Hence, St will then be (Sct , Sat , Sst ), with children, adults and seniors, for instance. Most of the
equations of the dynamics become multivariate, and parameters will be vectors, except β that
becomes a WAIFW (or Who Acquires Infection From Whom) matrix, as in Wallinga et al. (2006)
or Mossong et al. (2008). The main interest would be to have target and age-specific controls,
with testing and lockdown that can be per age group. The difficult component in this multivariate
extension is on the objective function, where the economic component should probably be more
related to well-being cost of being quarantined, especially for people who do not belong to labor
groups. This paves the way for further researches.
Finally let us notice that in this paper, as always in epidemic modelling, an important feature
is the −/+ problem, with undetected people. Testing and tracing is clearly an important issue
that needs further research. We mainly presented here the testing strategies, with antigen and
antibody tests. But as suggested in Eames and Keeling (2003); Clémençon et al. (2008); House
and Keeling (2010); Kiss et al. (2013) (among many others), tracing is clearly a natural tool that
should be optimized, to lower the economic cost of the disease without endangering the entire
population (and increase the sanitary cost of the pandemic).
2On some graphs, we have a long term value of Rt above 1, but it is obtained when the close to the
terminal date T and due to the numerical approximation of the infinite horizon control problem by a finite
horizon one.
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A Parameters of the epidemic dynamics
First, let us notice, as mentioned in the main text, that there is an underlying individual based
model for the system (1), in which the rates have a probabilistic interpretation, and can be
interpreted as inverse of mean times (e.g. Ball et al. (2019)), possibly with thinning when the
corresponding events only occur for a fraction of the population. Based on these remarks, we can
compute the rates in our model with the parameters provided in the French COVID-19 literature
(see Domenico et al. (2020); Salje et al. (2020)).
Obtaining the transition rates from the sojourn times and transition probabilities
First, we introduce some variables onwhich themechanistic construction of our rates will depend:
• pa: conditioned on being infected, the probability of having light symptoms or no symp-
toms;
• pH : conditioned on being mild/severely ill, the probability of needing hospitalization;
• pU : conditioned on needing hospitalization, the probability of needing ICU;
• pd : conditioned on being admitted to ICU, the probability of dying,
and for the durations:
• N(a)
R
: if asymptomatic, number of days until recovery;
• N(s)
R
: if symptomatic, number of days until recovery without hospital;
• NH : (if severe symptomatic) number of days until hospitalization;
• NHU : if in H, number of days until ICU ;
• NHR: if hospitalized but not in ICU, the number of days until recovery;
• NUD = 10: if in ICU, number of days until death;
• NUR = 20: if in ICU, number of days until recovery.
These variables can bemeasured quite easily on the data. Then, once these parameters are chosen,
we can propose the following transition rates for our model:
• γIR , the daily individual transition rate from I to R, is assumed to be of the form:
γIR = (1 − pa) · (1 − pH ) · 1
N(s)
R
+ pa · 1
N(a)
R
,
where on the right hand side, the first term is associated to mild symptomatic while the
second term is associated to severe ones.
• γIH , the daily rate from I to H, is assumed to be
γIH = (1 − pa) · pH · 1NIH .
• γHU , the daily rate from H to U, is given by
γHU = pU × 1NHU .
• γHR , the daily rate from H to R, is given by
γHR = (1 − pU ) · 1NHR .
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• For the transition rates from U to R or D, the nonlinearity induced by the constraint on
the ICU capacity Umax implies that it is easier to give these rates at the population level
rather than at the individual level. For the transition from U to R, the individual rate is
denoted by γUR(U) and the population rate is then γUR(U) ×U. We assume here that:
γUR(U) ×U =

(1 − pd) ·
1
NUR
U, if U < Umax,
(1 − pd) ·
1
NUR
Umax, if U ≥ Umax.
This means that when the ICU capacityUmax is reached, new patients can not be taken in
charge any more and since they correspond to individuals with severe forms of the disease,
they can not recover until the ICU occupation is lowered.
• As for the transition rate from U to R, the transition rate from U to D is nonlinear. We
denote by γUD(U) the daily death rate of an individual needing ICU, and by γUD(U) ×U
the transition at the population level, that we assume is of the form:
γUD(U) ×U =

pd ·
1
NUD
U, if U < Umax,
pd ·
1
NUD
Umax +
20
NUD
(U −Umax), if U ≥ Umax.
(15)
The hypothesis is that when ICU gets saturated, the patients who are not taken in charge
experience an extra death rate.
Parameter values For the infection parameter β, we fix the value of R0 and then compute
the corresponding value of β using (2). Salje et al. (2020) use R0 = 3.3 (in absence of lockdown
intervention and of testing policy), which we also recover from the early French dynamics (World
Health Organization (2020)) using the methods described in Trapman et al. (2016) (not shown).
The other transition rates appearing on Fig. 1 can be obtained once the probabilities and
durations detailed above are fixed. For this, we choose our parameters on the basis of the works by
Domenico et al. (2020); Salje et al. (2020) for the French COVID-19 epidemics. We emphasize
that despite of this choice, the methodology developed here is general and can apply to any
country of disease.
Table 3: Parameters. (a): parameters obtained fromDi Domenico et al. Domenico et al.
(2020). (b): parameters obtained from Salje et al. Salje et al. (2020). (c): parameters
used in the benchmark scenario in this paper
Probabilities Durations (days)
pa pH pU pd N
(a)
R N
(s)
R NIH NHU NHR NUD NUR
(a) 0.52 0.17 0.25 0.20 7.5 7.5
(b) 0.182 0.20 11 2 17.15 10 10.23
(c) 0.85 0.17 0.182 0.20 7.5 7.5 11 2 17.15 10 10.23
The line (a) in the Table 3 can be obtained as follow. The model of Domenico et al. (2020) for
Ile-de-France is structured into 3 age-classes: children (25%), adults (60%) and seniors (15%).
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Using the age-specific transition probabilities given in this reference and averaging over the age
classes, we obtain the values announced:
pa =0.2 + 0.8
(
0.25 × 1 + 0.75 × 0.2) = 0.52
pH =
0.60 × 0.10 + 0.15 × 0.20
0.60 × (0.70 + 0.10) + 0.15 × (0.6 + 0.20) = 0.17
pU =0.60 × 0.36 + 0.15 × 0.2 = 0.246
pd =
0.60 × 0.0074 + 0.15 × 0.029
060 × (0.0074 + 0.05) + 0.15 × (0.029 + 0.036) = 0.20
However, it appears in our simulations that the probability pa = 0.52 to be asymptomatic or
only with light symptoms does not provide realistic orders for the proportion of dead individuals.
In Salje et al. (2020), they estimate the proportion of being hospitalized when infected at 2.6%.
This proportion corresponds to (1− pa) pH in our model, yielding a probability pa = 0.85 when
we use the estimate pH = 0.17 of Domenico et al. (2020).
The additional mortality rate for individuals in ICUs when Ut > Umax is chosen 20 times
more than the usual death rate in (15). This factor is calibrated from the observation by Salje
et al. (2020) that the mean time to death in hospitals is bi-modal, with a group dying quickly after
0.67 days on average and a second group who die after longer time periods of mean 13.2 days.
Extrapolating we assumed that ‘urgent’ cases die 20 times faster than ‘usual cases’.
For the value of I−0 , (Flaxman et al., 2020, Table 1) report a total number of infected of 3%,
with a 95% credible interval [1.1%;7.8%], as of 28th March 2020 (which is two week after our
t = 0). Because of the exponential increase, a crude estimate would be below 1% two weeks
before. The number of reported cases in France on March 15 was around 5,000. According to
Sachdeva and Sheth (2020), when Italy had 5,000 reported cases, an estimation of 60,000 cases
was suggested, which would imply a I−0 close to 1‰. In our benchmark scenario, we kept that
5‰ value for I−0 .
To check the validity of our parameters, we simulated our model in absence of intervention
(δ = 0, λ1 ≡ 0 and λ2 ≡ 0) and compare the results with the prediction of Roux et al. (2020).
Because in the latter reference they do notmodel the ICU saturation, we also removed the threshold
Umax and the associated additional mortality (which amounts to consideringUmax = +∞). Doing
this we obtain similar results as those of Roux et al. (2020).
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B Sensitivities to the model specifications
In this appendix, we provide sensitivity graphs, where parameters are changed, to assess the
robustness of our conclusions. Do not forget that numerical approximations errors can affect the
interpretations of the following numerical illustrations. We will also comment trends observed
here.
B.1 Impact of the initial virus prevalence I−0
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Figure 6: Evolution of states with optimal control δ for three different values of I−0 .
The plain line is the benchmark scenario discussed in Section 3.2; the dashed line
corresponds to a smaller weight for I−0 while the dotted line corresponds to a larger I
−
0 .
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B.2 Impact of the basic reproductive number R0
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Figure 7: Evolution of states with optimal control δ for three different values of R0.
The plain line is the benchmark scenario discussed in Section 3.2; the dashed line
corresponds to a smaller value of R0 (−0.3) while the dotted line corresponds to a
larger value of R0 (+0.3).
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B.3 Impact of balancing sanitary and socio-economic costs
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Figure 8: Evolution of states with optimal control δ for three different values of
wsanitary. The plain line is the benchmark scenario discussed in Section 3.2; the dashed
line corresponds to a smaller weight for wsanitary (half) while the dotted line corresponds
to a larger weight (twice).
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B.4 Impact of the vaccination arrival date
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Figure 9: Evolution of states with optimal control δ for three different values of α, the
discount rate that reflects the expected arrival time of a vaccine (and a cure). The plain
line is the benchmark scenario discussed in Section 3.2; the dashed line corresponds to
α = 1/500.
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B.5 Impact of additional effort in virologic detection λ1
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Figure 10: Evolution of states with optimal control δ for three different values of λ1. The
plain line is the benchmark scenario discussed in Section 3.2; and then three scenarios,
with λ1 = 1‰ (dashed line), λ1 = 1% (dotted line) and λ1 = 10% (mixed line).
36
B.6 Optimizing over effort in virologic detection without lockdown
intervention
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Figure 11: Evolution of states with optimal control δ corresponding to the bench-
mark scenario discussed in Section 3.2 (plain line); and evolution with optimal type-1
detection effort λ1 without lockdown intervention (δ = 0).
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B.7 Optimizing over both lockdown intervention δ and effort in
virologic detection λ1 without lockdown intervention
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Figure 12: Evolution of states with optimal control δ corresponding to the benchmark
scenario discussed in Section 3.2 (plain line); and evolution with optimal lockdown δ
coupled with optimal type-1 detection strategy, captured with parameter λ1.
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B.8 Impact of additional effort in immunity detection λ2
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Figure 13: Evolution of states with optimal control δ for three different values of λ2
given a fixed level of λ1 (here 1%), with λ2 = 1‰ (dashed line), λ2 = 1% (dotted line)
and λ2 = 10% (mixed line).
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B.9 Optimizing over effort in immunity detection λ2 without lock-
down intervention
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Figure 14: Evolution of states with optimal control δ corresponding to the benchmark
scenario discussed in Section 3.2 (plain line), without any type-2 detection (λ2 = 0);
and evolution with optimal type-2 control λ2, without any lowdown (δ = 0). In both
cases, there is no type-1 detection strategy (λ1 = 0).
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B.10 Optimizing over both lockdown intervention δ and effort in
immunity detection λ2
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Figure 15: Evolution of states with optimal control δ corresponding to the benchmark
scenario discussed in Section 3.2 (plain line); and evolution with optimal lockdown δ
coupled with optimal type-2 detection strategy, captured with parameter λ2. In both
cases, there is no type-1 detection strategy (λ1 = 0).
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B.11 Optimizing over lockdown intervention δ, and efforts in viro-
logic detection λ1 and immunity detection λ2
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Figure 16: Evolution of states with optimal control δ corresponding to the benchmark
scenario discussed in Section 3.2 (plain line); and evolution with optimal lockdown δ
coupled with optimal detection strategy, with both type-1 and type-2 screening tech-
niques, captured with parameters λ1 and λ2.
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C Numerical resolution of the optimal control problem
We discuss in this section the numerical resolution of the optimal control problem (12) of interest.
The original problem has infinite horizon, but for numerical purpose, we focus on the
equivalent version over a sufficiently large time horizon T . The proximity between both optimal
control problems is well established in the literature, see e.g. Section 4.1 in Elie (2008), while
we observe empirically very few impact by the choice of maturity T , as soon as T is chosen large
enough in order for the epidemic phase to be over (i.e. such that the proportion of infected people
is small enough at time T). With respect to the random time of vaccination τ, such approximation
corresponds to optimizing over the time interval [0, τ ∨ T] instead of [0, τ].
Similarly, the problem (12) is an optimal control problem with sate constraint on the ICU
capacity, and we choose to replace for ease of numerical tractability the state constraint by a
penalization cost with a sufficiently large weight wICU > 0. Hence, we focus numerically on an
approximate version of the original optimal control, which is given by:
inf
(δ,λ1,λ2)∈A
{
J˜T (δ, λ1, λ2)
}
, (16)
where the approximate objective function J˜T is given by
J˜T (δ, λ1, λ2) := wsanitary
∫ T
0
e−αtdDt + wecon
∫ T
0
e−αt (1 −Wt )2dt (17)
+ wprevalence
∫ T
0
e−αt |N1t |2dt + wimmunity
∫ T
0
e−αt |N2t |2dt ,
+ wICU
∫ T
0
e−αt [Ut −Umax]+dt , .
C.1 Optimality condition by Pontryagin’s maximum principle
To alleviate the notation and use more standrad notations from the litterature, the problem can be
recast in the following form, where a denotes the control and X the state: Minimize
J(a) =
∫ T
0
f (t, Xt, at )dt + g(XT )
subject to
ÛXt = b(Xt, at ), X0 = x0 given.
We interpret Xt = (St, I−t , I+t , R−t , R+t ,Ht,Ut,Dt ) ∈ [0, 1]8 ⊂ R8, at = (δ, λ1t , λ2t ) ∈ [0, 1]3 and
we take
f (t, X, a) = wsanitarye−αtγUD(U)U + wecone−αt (1 −W)2
+ wprevalencee
−αt |N1 |2 + wimmunitye−αt |N2 |2 + wICUe−αt [U −Umax]+ ,
where
Q := R− + I− + S, W := (1 − δ)Q + R+, N1 := λ1Q + γIH I−, N2t := λ2Q.
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Moreover, we take
b(X, a) =
©­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­«
−(1 − δ)βI−S
(1 − δ)βI−S − λ1I− − (γIR + γIH )I−
λ1I− − (γIR + γIH )I+
γIR I− − λ2t R−
γIR I+ + λ2R− + γHRH + γUR(U)U
γIH
(
I− + I+
) − (γHR + γHU )H
γHUH − (γUR(U) + γUD(U))U
γUD(U)U
ª®®®®®®®®®®®®®®®®¬
=
©­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­«
−(1 − δ)βI−S
(1 − δ)βI−S − λ1I− − (γIR + γIH )I−
λ1I− − (γIR + γIH )I+
γIR I− − λ2t R−
γIR I+ + λ2R− + γHRH + ρUR(U)
γIH
(
I− + I+
) − (γHR + γHU )H
γHUH − (ρUR(U) + ρUD(U))
ρUD(U)
ª®®®®®®®®®®®®®®®®¬
,
where we denoted ρUR(u) = γUR(u)u and ρUD(u) = γUD(u)u in order to alleviate the notation.
Let H be the Hamiltonian defined by
H(t, x, y, a) = b(x, a) · y + f (t, x, a).
Pontryagin’s maximum principle leads, at least informally, to the following optimality con-
dition: if aˆ = (aˆt )t is optimal, then for every t ∈ [0,T],
0 = ∂δH(Xˆt, Yˆt, aˆt )
= 2wecone−αt |Qˆt |2δˆt + 2wecone−αtQˆt (1 − Qˆt − Rˆ+t ) + β Iˆ−t Sˆt (YˆS − Yˆ I
− ) ,
0 = ∂λ1H(Xˆt, Yˆt, aˆt )
= 2wprevalencee−αtQˆt (Qˆt λˆ1t + γIH Iˆ−t ) − Iˆ−t (Yˆ I
−
t − Yˆ I
+
t ) ,
0 = ∂λ2H(Xˆt, Yˆt, aˆt )
= 2wimmunitye−αt |Qˆt |2λˆ2t − Iˆ−t (Yˆ I
−
t − Yˆ I
+
t ) ,
where (Xˆ, Yˆ ) = (S, I−, I+, R−, R+,H,U,D,YS,Y I−,Y I+,YR−,YR+,YH,YU,YD) solve the forward-
backward ODE system: { ÛˆXt = b(Xˆt, aˆt ), Xˆ0 = x0ÛˆYt = −∂xH(t, Xˆt, Yˆt, aˆt ), YˆT = 0. (18)
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The backward equation can be written as follows (dropping the hats to alleviate the notation):
ÛˆYSt = −
[
(1 − δ)βI−(YSt − Y I
−
t )
−2wecone−αt (1 − δ)
(
1 −Wt
)
+ 2wprevalencee−αtλ1N1t + 2wimmunitye−αtλ2N2t
]
ÛˆY I−t = −
[
(1 − δ)βS(YSt − Y I
−
t ) + λ1(Y I
+
t − Y I
−
t ) + γIR(YR
−
t − Y I
−
t ) + γIH (YHt − Y I
−
t )
−2wecone−αt (1 − δ)
(
1 −Wt
)
+ 2wprevalencee−αt (λ1 + γIH )N1t + 2wimmunitye−αtλ2N2t
]
ÛˆY I+t = −
[
γIR(YR+t − Y I
+
t ) + γIH (YHt − Y I
+
t )
]
ÛˆYR−t = −
[
λ2(YR+t − YR
−
t )
−2wecone−αt (1 − δ)
(
1 −Wt
)
+ 2wprevalencee−αtλ1N1t + 2wimmunitye−αtλ2N2t
]
ÛˆYR+t = −
[
− 2wecone−αt
(
1 −Wt
) ]
ÛˆYHt = −
[
γHR(YR+t − YHt ) + γHU (YUt − YHt )
]
ÛˆYUt = −
[
ρ′UR(U)(YR
+
t − YUt ) + ρ′UD(U)(YDt − YUt )
+wsanitarye−αt ρ′UD(Ut ) + wICUe−αt1Ut>Umax
]
ÛˆYDt = 0 .
C.2 Numerical algorithm
The numerical method is an iterative procedure to compute the optimal control aˆ = (δˆ, λˆ1, λˆ2) =
(δˆt, λˆ1t , λˆ2t )t∈[0T ]. Starting from an initial guess a(0), at iteration k ≥ 0, in order to compute a(k+1),
we first compute the solution (X(k),Y (k)) to the forward-backward ODE system corresponding
to (18) but with control a(k) instead of aˆ, i.e.,{ ÛX(k)t = b(X(k)t , a(k)t ), X(k)0 = x0
ÛY (k)t = −∂xH(X(k)t ,Y (k)t , a(k)t ), Y (k)T = 0.
We then set
a˜(k+1)t = a
(k)
t − θ(k)∂aH(Xt,Yt, a(k)t ) ,
where θ(k) > 0 is a step size (which may depend on the iteration in order to adjust the convergence
rate).
Finally, we define, for each component i of the control,
ai,(k+1)t = pi[0,1](a˜i,(k+1)t )
where pi[0,1] denotes the projection on the interval [0, 1].
If the optimization is to be performed over only one component of the control (e.g. over δ
only), then the updates are done only for this component instead of the whole vector of controls.
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